

# A new approach for estimating the equity premium based on credit valuations

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# Introduction

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## ■ Main objectives

- Use the Merton model to estimate the market Sharpe ratio
- Infer this Sharpe ratio from market variables only
  - Credit derivatives (CDS) spreads
  - Correlation between asset value and market portfolio

## ■ Main interests in this paper

- Original methodology with strong advantage : no need to calibrate unknown variables
  - dividends or earnings growth as in dividend discount models
  - asset values or default barriers as in structural model
- Infer a Sharpe ratio based on actual valuations in the CDS market (at current business conditions)
  - Avoids the « equity premium puzzle » of historical estimations
- Very complete empirical tests of methodology's robustness
- Many practical applications possible... to be tested !

# Methodology

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## ■ Merton (1974) model

- Company's debt is a zero bond
  
- Default if the asset value of the company falls below the nominal value of the zero bond at the maturity
  
- Strong hypothesis : default only possible at the maturity of the bond
  
- Merton's formula can be reversed, Market Sharpe Ratio function of :
  - the actual and risk neutral default probabilities of the company
  - the maturity of the bond
  - the correlation between the assets value and market portfolio
  
- Need to approximate the correlation asset /market returns by the correlation equity /market return
  - negligible error as in the Merton framework, equity value is a deep in the money call option on the asset

## Methodology

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### ■ Limitations of the Merton (1974) model

- Default only at maturity
- Complete information

### ■ Expansion to 2 types of models relaxing these strong hypotheses

#### ■ the simple first passage time model

- default occurs as soon as the asset value falls below a certain barrier (observable or not)
- asset value observable
- adjustment factor for the Merton model determined numerically
- close to 1 for IG, and if the asset volatility is higher than 10%
- note that asset volatility < 10% observed only for financial companies

#### ■ the Duffie – Lando (2001) model

- unobservable barrier and unobservable asset process
- model compatible with reduced form pricing models as we can derive a default intensity function
- Confirms the Merton model for all IG companies

# Methodology

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## ■ Data used

- 125 firms in the CDX index 5Y
  - included in NYSE or Nasdaq listing
- CDS spreads to derive risk neutral default proba
- 2 proxies for actual defaults
  - Expected default proba from Moodys KMV
  - Actual Moodys ratings
- S&P500 = approximation of market portfolio
- 2003-2007 sample period

# Results

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## ■ Estimated average Sharpe Ratio (2003-2007)

- Market SR= 0.4 – 0.39 (EDF or Moodys default proba)
- Company SR= 0.2 - 0.19
- Robustness to model changes
- Important fluctuations through time
- Differences accross sectors : between 0.3 and 0.45
- Outlier : consumer stable due to low correlation with market

## ■ Estimation globally in line with traditional measures

- In line with lower band historical estimations
  - SR =0.4-0.5 with equity premium of 7-9% (average 50Y), probably overestimated
- Slightly higher than « fair » estimations
  - SR =0.15-0.3 with equity premium around 3-5%
- Control of 2 sources of biais :
  - SR underestimation due to the fact that credit spreads do not reflect only credit risk but also liquidity, transaction costs, etc.
  - Difficult to estimate the portion of spread due to credit risk only
  - SR overestimation due to tax effect ? With tax adjustment : market SR = 0.32

## Questions

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### ■ Methodology based on time-varying financial variables only

- A strong advantage for estimation
- Can be a drawback if credit valuations do not reflect financial conditions
  - during 2004-2007 long period of very (abnormally?) low spreads (sample period ends before Subprime crisis)
  - Problem for future estimations : abnormally high level of credit spreads during Subprime crisis

### ■ The question of empirical validity of the CAPM model

- Used to measure the link between market and company returns
- Strong assumption : expected returns of all assets are linearly related to their betas
  - $\text{Excess return company} = \text{beta} * \text{Excess return market}$
- Other variables can have explanatory power
- Could we have a less restrictive / more realistic assumption ?

## Questions

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### ■ How to deal with the credit spreads « puzzle » ?

■ Use only the part of the spread due to credit risk, excluding other components

□ **Liquidity premium compensating for lower liquidity**

Schultz (2001) estimation for US corporate market : 27 bp

Driessen (2003) estimation 20% of the spread

Perraudin Taylor (2003) even larger estimates

□ **Credit risk premium due volatility of credit spread**

Elton et al. (2001) between 19% and 41%

Driessen (2003) 18% (AA, 5Y maturity), 52% (BBB, 10Y maturity)

□ **Taxation effects compensating different taxation corporate/gvt bonds**

Elton et al. (2001) : 28-73%

Driessen (2003) : 34-57%

□ **Component due to credit risk diversification difficulty**

Amato Remolona (2003)

■ Litterature explaining the credit spreads components, what about CDS spreads ?

## Further investigation

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- Daily estimation could be used for tactical equity strategies ?
  - Sharpe ratios are time varying over business cycle
  - Here only use of historical average
  - Advantage of this methodology : we can capture their time variation and estimate daily Sharpe ratios based on CDS valuations
  - CDS spreads show predictive power on credit spreads (De Wit (2006), Blanco et al. (2005), Norden and Weber (2004))
  - We could test predictive power on equities
  - Test of strategies on sectors / single names